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Abstract 
 
For the last ten years a group of Latin American countries have passed legal 
reforms raising ballot access requirements. Although each of these reforms have been 
profusely discussed in every one of the countries involved, so far, they have not been 
linked as constituting a regional trend. Firstly this paper shows that this trend actually 
exists, so reversing the dominant leaning on reforms in this field during the 1980s and 
1990s. Secondly, the paper shows that the ongoing regional trend emerges in the 
aftermath of a legitimacy crisis which has been surmounted in every one of the cases.  
More specifically, the paper identifies a common sequence followed by four 
countries (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) which leads to the raise of ballot 
access requirements. The sequence involves the following stages: first, a legitimacy 
crisis which paves the way to reforms opening up the political system; second, once the 
legitimacy crisis is left behind, a consensus emerges on the negative consequences of 
the previous reforms; and third, this consensus culminates with the introduction of the 
restrictive reforms which have dominated the Latin American landscape for the last 
decade.      
Every case is analyzed by observing the coalescence of what Matthew Shugart 
(2001) defined as the inherent and contingent conditions necessary to account for the 
passing of electoral reforms.   
 
 
 
Parties and Ballot Access in Latin America: A New Trend in a New Political 
Context 
 
The presence of quantitative requirements for ballot access is a common feature of 
representative democracies. Even though rarely studied, these quantitative requirements 
may have significant consequences over the functioning of a political system (Lewis-
Beck and Squire, 1995; Birnir, 2004). Fixing strict criteria in terms of members, spatial 
distribution, or votes can lead to what Kenneth Janda calls a “Protection Model”, in 
which the law protects existing parties from potential competitors (2005:12). When 
parties deliberately impose high entry barriers to avoid potential challengers there could 
be a cartelization (Katz and Mair, 1995) or a de facto closing of the party system 
(Issacharoff and Pildes, 1998). To the contrary, too lenient conditions can foster in 
certain contexts the fragmentation of the party system.  
During most part of the 20th Century the regulation of ballot access in Latin 
America was marked by the existence of what the legal doctrine called qualitative 
requirements (Vanossi, 2000:258). In a context of institutional instability and deep 
ideological polarization, this regulation was mainly directed to prevent the electoral 
participation of left-wing parties or simply to outlaw specific parties or leaders (López, 
2001; Molenaar, 2012). Since the third wave of democratization, the issue of the 
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qualitative requirements lost preeminence, to be replaced by the rising importance of 
quantitative requirements. In particular during the late 1980s and 1990s there was a 
strong trend towards a reduction in the quantitative requirements to form parties and run 
elections, as a reaction to social demands to open the political systems (Tanaka, 2005; 
Mustapic, 2012). However, over the last years a group of Latin American countries has 
implemented reforms raising party-formation costs.1 And it is particularly noteworthy 
that, while each of these reforms has been broadly discussed and analyzed in every one 
of the countries in which they took place, they have not been so far identified as part of 
a regional trend.  
This paper seeks to contribute to the study of party and electoral law in 
contemporary Latin America in two main ways. First, it identifies and describes a so far 
overlooked trend involving a group of countries, a trend which develops in an opposite 
sense than the one which had been dominant until a few years ago. Second, it offers a 
tentative answer to the question about why in the last years some Latin American 
countries raised party-formation costs. This answer brings to the fore the issue of party 
fragmentation as a problem perceived by political elites. Political fragmentation 
emerges then as a new issue motivating political elites to promote electoral reforms. But 
fragmentation by its own does not suffice to explain why some countries raised ballot 
access requirements while some others did not. This paper shows that countries which 
did pass these reforms are those in which fragmentation is perceived as a result of 
abuses caused by previous reforms which opened up the political system as a response 
to political legitimacy crises.  
These two goals determine how the paper is organized. The first section analyses 
party-formation costs´ reforms implemented over the last decade in Colombia, Peru, 
Mexico and Argentina. The second section, more extensive, explains the conditions 
which ushered in the sanction and implementation of these reforms, underlining a 
common pattern shared by the four cases.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The concept “party-formation costs” is adopted from Hug (2001) and Birnir (2004), and refers to 
quantitative pre and post election requirements to obtain and retain legal recognition which allows 
political organizations to run for elections. Instead, ballot access requirements refer, in strict sense to pre-
election requirements only, and do not necessarily to parties. Yet, ballot access is often used with the 
same meaning of party-formation costs and therefore in this paper the two terms are used 
interchangeably, even when party-formation costs is preferred for being more accurate,  
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The Rising of Party-formation Costs as a New Trend in Latin America 
 
Although several works have described the presence of party-formation costs in 
Latin America (Bendel, 1997; Bareiro and Soto, 2007; Franco-Cuervo y Floréz, 2008), 
it is difficult to find comparative studies in this field concerned with the comparative 
development of legislation. An exception to this gap is the recent work of Fransje 
Molenaar. By observing continuities and breaks in the regulation of political parties in 
the region, this author focuses on ballot access requirements to point out that “the 
registration and dissolution of political parties has been an active field of party law 
reform over the last decade” (Molenaar, 2012:16). Molenaar concludes that there is no 
clear trend in this field, since both a trend opening up and a trend closing up the party 
systems are visible, each one involving a group of four countries (2012:18).  
Certainly, as Molenaar points out, some countries introduced or strengthened the 
option to run elections through non-partisan vehicles, as political movements or even 
independent candidates. This is the case of Ecuador (in 1995), Venezuela (in 1999), 
Bolivia (in 2004) and Mexico in 2012, although in this last case, only provisionally and 
still without precise rules. However, it is highly debatable whether the introduction of 
independent candidacies in these countries implies an opposed trend to the one 
described above. Indeed, the non-partisan candidacies introduced in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s must fulfill identical or very similar quantitative requirements than political 
parties, being these requirements quite stringent in all these countries, all of which put 
into question whether they really entail an opening-up of the political system.2 
In this paper I contend that an attentive overhaul of this topic shows that over the 
last ten years there has been a clearly dominant trend, in the sense of imposing political 
organizations more stringent requirements for ballot access. As a matter of fact, during 
this period four countries introduced significant reforms to party-formation rules, and 
all of them did it in the same restrictive line, closing up the party system. As it is shown 
in Table 1, this is the case of Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Argentina.3  
                                                 
2
 In Venezuela, the “groups of voters” must prove the support of at least 0.5 per cent of the voters from 
the electoral district in which they seek to compete, the same requirements imposed to parties. The 
“citizens by their own initiative” must meet a much demanding requirement: 5 per cent of signatures of 
the electoral register. In Ecuador, “political movements”, exactly as parties, must gather 1.5 per cent of 
signatures to run elections. The same applies to Bolivia, where “groups of citizens”, “indigenous people”, 
and political parties must prove their supporters reach the 2 per cent of the previous election turnout.  
3
 One year earlier, in 2002, Panamá reduced the number of required signatures to constitute a party from 5 
to 4 per cent of the previous election total turnout. With this requirement Panama remains among the 
most restrictive democracies in the world regarding ballot access, and therefore this reform can hardly be 
pointed as opening up the political system.   
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Table 1: Major party-formation costs reforms in Latin America 2003-2009: Argentina, Colombia, México 
and Peru 
Argentina 2009:  
a. Party membership instead of signatures to obtain and 
retain legal recognition. 
b. 2% vote in each district to retain legal recognition 
(before: 2% in one district to retain legal recognition in 
all districts) 
c. 1,5% votes as a threshold in primaries to run in general 
elections 
Colombia 2003:  
a. 2% vote to obtain legal recognition (before: 50,000 
signatures)  
b. Threshold of 2% vote or 50% of quotient for seats 
c. Ban on multiple lists 
d. Ban on double membership 
 
2009: 
a. Rise of votes for legal recognition and threshold for 
seats to 3% 
Mexico 
 
2003: 
a. Rise of number of states and/or majoritarian districts in 
which party assemblies must be constituted in order to 
obtain legal recognition 
b. Rise in the number of members to obtain legal 
recognition from 0.13 to 0.26% of electoral register 
c. Ban on new parties to form coalitions 
 
2008: 
a. Permission to new parties to form coalitions, but 
counting votes per coalition parties, each one must 
reach 2%  
Peru 2003: 
a. Formation of party members` committees 
geographically distributed  
b. 5% votes or one congressman elected to retain legal 
recognition (before: only signatures) 
 
2005: 
a. Rise from 1 to 6 congressmen to retain legal 
recognition. 
b.  Threshold of 5% for seats starting in 2010 (4% in 
2006) 
 
2009:  
a.   Rise in the number of supporters from 1 to 3 per cent to 
obtain legal recognition  
 
The following paragraphs describe in some detail the legal reforms passed by each 
of these four countries to reach similar goals. 
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Colombia 
In Colombia two legal reforms, passed in 2003 and 2009, modified the 
requirements for parties to obtain legal recognition and nominate candidates. The 2003 
reform pursued to limit the fragmentation of the party system, as well as parties´ 
personalization and internal disorder (Roll y Pérez, 2011; Hernández Becerra, 
2006:337). With that goal, the Legislative Act 1 of July 3, 2003, replaced article 108 of 
the Constitution. This article required parties and political movements 50,000 votes or 
signatures to obtain legal recognition, and demanded 50,000 votes or the election of a 
congressman to retain that status. The reform abolished those requirements stipulating 
that in order to obtain legal recognition it was necessary to get at least 2 per cent of the 
votes cast to the Senate or the House of Representatives; not reaching that percentage 
entails the register’s cancellation. The reform also fixed a threshold of 2 per cent of the 
vote for the Senate and 50 per cent of the quotient correspondent to each district for the 
House of Representatives. In the same vein, aiming to make parties more cohesive, the 
new legal framework eliminated the option for parties to nominate multiple lists (a 
provision also incorporated by the 1991 Constitution). A similar goal followed the ban 
on double affiliations, a by then tacitly authorized practice (De la Calle, 2010).  
A new constitutional reform, passed in 2009 (Legislative Act 1, July 14, 2009), 
raised the requirements and restrictions imposed in 2003. The reform approved in 2003 
had been successful in several concerns, but had not managed to reduce significantly the 
effective number of legislative parties (Roll y Pérez, 2011:6). In order to advance 
towards that aim, the reform elevated both the votes required to obtain legal recognition 
and the threshold to allocate seats from two to three percent. Additionally, in order to 
raise defection costs and to entrench existing parties, the reform established that those 
congressmen who decide to run elections through a party different to the one by which 
they were elected must renounce their seat not later than 12 months prior to registering 
the nominations.  
 
Peru 
During the course of the last ten years, Peru substantially raised party-formation 
costs. The first and foremost measure in this direction was the approval of a party law, 
in November 2003. This law was decisively oriented to cut down the number of parties, 
and to strengthen those (presumably few) which would meet the new requirements 
(Tanaka, 2005:122; Meléndez, 2006). The law reestablished the partisan monopoly to 
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run elections for national positions (which had been eliminated by the 1979 
Constitution), and substantially raised ballot access requirements.  
According to Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, the main barrier introduced by this law 
lies on the requirement for new parties to constitute the party members´ committees 
with no less than 50 members each in at least one third of the country provinces (65 out 
of 195) including no less than two thirds of the provinces (17 out of 25). While this 
entails a minimum number of members of 3,250, the key aspect lies on the stringent 
spatial registration requirement which seeks to ensure that parties have a real national 
character (Tuesta, 2006:778; Meléndez, 2006:47). The law also created a party-
members public register aimed to avoid apocryphal supports, and attempted to limit 
defections by prohibiting legislators to quit their parties at least seven months before the 
elections if they are to run on a different party’s ticket. Lastly, the reform fixed 
comparatively strict conditions to retain the register: parties should get a five percent of 
the valid vote in national elections or have at least one representative elected. In 2005 
the law was amended modifying this option. From then on, parties would not keep the 
register unless they had six representatives elected (or obtained five percent of the vote, 
as in the original text). Simultaneously, Congress introduced a threshold of five per cent 
of the national vote for the allocation of seats, as of the 2010 elections.  
And still, in 2009 a new reform raised the number of party members required to 
obtain legal recognition from one to three percent of the previous election turnout.   
 
Mexico  
In December 2003 Mexican Congress reformed the Federal Code of Electoral 
Processes and Institutions (COFIPE) in the same direction than the previously referred 
cases. On the one hand, the reform raised party-formation requirements: instead of 3000 
members in 10 states or 300 members in 100 single member districts, and a total of 0.13 
percent of the national electoral register – as it was prior to the reform – the amendment 
required 3000 members in 20 states or 300 members in 200 single member districts, 
which otherwise should amount to 0.26 percent of the national register. The reform also 
raised the requirement of party members´ assemblies, whose number was increased in 
the same rate as party members (from 10 state assemblies or 100 district assemblies to 
20 state and 200 district assemblies). The reform also imposed a stricter control over 
The Legal Regulation of Political Parties, working paper 31/13 
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these assemblies, in order to ascertain the veracity and the date of the memberships to 
avoid “last minute memberships, as it used to be the case” (Flores Andrade, 2007:480).4 
Yet, the most demanding revision was the one prohibiting new parties to form 
electoral alliances the first time they run elections. This measure was aimed to prevent 
new parties from reaching the legal threshold through the constitution of electoral 
alliances, as it had happened with three parties in the 2000 elections (Flores Andrade, 
2006). This norm was amended once again in 2008, but in such a way that the practical 
consequences remained the same. While new parties were allowed to integrate electoral 
coalitions, the reform set forth that every member of the coalitions must appear 
separately in the ballot, so that while all votes cast for the parties are added to the 
coalition as a single political ticket, each party gets votes individually to determine 
whether it has or not reached the two percent required to maintain legal recognition.   
As in the previously analyzed cases, the Mexican reforms were also promoted with 
the explicit goal of reducing the number of parties. Yet in this case, more clearly than in 
the others, the objective was justified mainly on the basis of the generous funding that 
Mexican registered parties received from the state.  
 
Argentina 
By the end of 2009 Argentine Congress passed law 26571 amending the party law 
and the electoral code, with the explicit purpose of reducing the number of parties. The 
ruling party’s (Front for Victory-PJ, hereinafter FPV-PJ) highest political figures 
involved in this reform repeatedly stated that the amendments pursued stabilizing a 
party system which had become inchoate.5 In order to achieve this goal, the reform, as 
in the previously referred cases, raised the requirements to obtain and retain legal 
recognition. But, additionally, it disentangled the legal recognition from the right to run 
general elections by setting open and obligatory primary elections with a threshold as a 
qualifying round.   
With regard to legal recognition, the reform replaced the requirement of a 
percentage of signatures for a percentage of party members. This apparently subtle 
distinction is nonetheless crucial: The signatures required by law could belong to any 
citizen – including those not affiliated to any party, or even those affiliated to other 
                                                 
4
 The translation from Spanish to English in this case, as in the rest of the paper, belongs to the author. 
5
 In terms of senior official and political scientist Juan Manuel Abal Medina, “the core of the project lies 
in … consolidating a consistent and well-structured party system” (Abal Medina et al, 2010:51). 
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parties -, and the same citizen was allowed to support as many parties as he/she wanted. 
According to the new regulation, parties must show a number of members of at least 0.4 
per cent of the total registered voters of the district, a requirement which is checked 
every year.  
The reform also revised the causes for party cancellation. Previously, national 
parties kept their status by getting at least two percent of the vote in any one of the 24 
provinces of the country, in one every two legislative general elections. The new legal 
framework determines that parties must get two percent of the vote every two elections 
in every district where they want to maintain the register.  
On the other hand, the reform established a system of open, compulsory and 
simultaneous primaries (PASO), which function both as a mechanism to select 
candidates and as a qualifying round for parties, which must reach a threshold of 1.5 
percent vote to run in general elections. Likewise, parties or alliances must gather 1.5% 
in each district in which they want to run for deputies or senators. 
In sum, Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Argentina passed, in the last decade, legal 
reforms raising the requirements with the aim of stopping party fragmentation. This 
deliberate introduction of restrictive reforms implies an unprecedented and remarkable 
feature of party law in contemporary Latin America. 
   
Political Fragmentation and Legal Reform  
The reforms described above shared the explicit purpose of reducing party system 
fragmentation and, more specifically, lowering the number of legally recognized parties. 
This reveals that political fragmentation has emerged as a new political issue, which 
ruling and major parties in general seek to restrain, by means of legal reforms. 
In the last decades, Latin American democracies have witnessed the waning of 
traditional political identities and the profound personalization of electoral processes 
(Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring et al, 2006; Cheresky, 2011, among many 
others), as well as a strengthening of particularistic linkages to the detriment of 
programmatic ones (Roberts, 2002; Kitschelt et al, 2012). This led to the increase of 
electoral volatility rates and the continuous emergence of short-lived political forces. In 
many cases, governments besieged by legitimacy deficits primarily originated by 
economic crisis promoted political reforms opening up the channels of political 
representation (Tanaka, 2005). 
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Yet, in the 2000s the economic growth that spread out over the entire region made 
it possible to leave behind the recurring political crisis that used to affect Latin 
American countries. This favored political stability and granted elected leaders, 
regardless of their ideological profile and rhetoric, approval ratings unknown by their 
predecessors of the 1980s and 1990s. In this context, political elites, both traditional and 
new ones, found it both convenient and possible to introduce legal reforms to stop or 
slow down political fragmentation. 
Certainly, countries less affected by political fragmentation, those with a relatively 
more institutionalized party system – as for instance Uruguay, Chile, Panama or Costa 
Rica – have not implemented this sort of reforms. Conversely, countries seriously 
affected by political fragmentation did introduce reforms raising ballot access 
requirements already in the 1990s, as Ecuador and Bolivia.6  
However, even when fragmentation and growth in the number of parties appears as 
a necessary condition to the raising of party-formation costs, it does not suffice to 
explain why and how these latest reforms were passed and implemented. For instance, 
Mexico had 11 recognized parties when it approved the first restrictive reforms, while 
Brazil has 30 political parties, as of 2012, and has not modified its ballot access 
requirements. Interestingly, the four cases studied in this paper, in which a legal reform 
raising ballot access and party recognition requirements was passed recently, show a 
similar path made up by the following four steps (illustrated in table 2).   
a. A broad discredit of traditional parties entailing a legitimacy crisis, in the frame of 
which social demands to open up the political system gains ground  
b. Implementation of reforms aimed to “shorten the gap” between politicians and the 
people. This implies reducing party-formation costs and/or lowering barriers to obtain 
legislative seats.  
c. Proliferation of new legally recognized parties at the same time as the legitimacy 
crisis is surmounted (mostly due to reasons completely different to the reforms, mainly 
economic growth). This rise in the number of parties paves the way to a new consensus 
among political elites and experts on the negative consequences of the previous reforms.  
                                                 
6
 Bolivia enacted in 1999 a party law elevating the required members to form a party from 0.5 to 2 
percent of last election turnout, aiming to stop the multiplication of parties (Lazarte, 2010:299). 
Previously, in two successive reforms (1992 and 1997) Ecuador had raised the percentage of votes 
required to retain party registration up to 5 percent of the national vote. 
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d. The ruling party – usually supported by other major parties - finds it convenient to 
promote a reform to raise party-formation costs. 
 Table 2: Sequence followed by countries which raised ballot access requirements 
 Colombia  Perú  Argentina  México 
Legitimacy 
Crisis 
Exclusive two-
party system 
False Democracy Throw Everyone 
Out! 
(¡Que se vayan 
todos!) 
Electoral Fraud  
Reform to 
Open up the 
Political 
System  
New Constitution 
(1991) and Statute 
on Parties (1994): 
No barriers for 
electoral 
competition – 
Multiple lists. 
Single district with 
PR and no 
threshold for 
Senate 
New Constitution 
(1993): 
Unicameral 
Congress in single 
district with PR 
and no threshold. 
Reduction in the 
number of party 
members required 
to obtain legal 
recognition (2001)  
Elimination of 
party dissolution 
clauses 
 
 
Conditional 
Register for parties 
Negative 
Consequences 
Proliferation of 
parties: Electoral 
microenterprises 
Proliferation of 
parties: Disposable 
Parties 
Proliferation of 
parties: Parties as 
rubber stamps 
(Moderate) 
proliferation of 
parties: Register 
for public funding 
Reforms to 
Close the 
Political 
System  
Constitutional 
Amendments 2003 
and 2009 
Party Law 2003 
and successive 
reforms (2005 and 
2009) 
Party Law reform 
2009 
Electoral Code 
reforms 2003 and 
2008 
 
Of course, this is not to suggest that only countries following this sequence can pass 
reforms raising ballot access requirements. But it is interesting to note that whilst 
fragmentation is admitted as a problem which should be addressed via legal reforms in 
other Latin American countries (as for instance in Brazil - see Fleischer y Barreto, 2010 
- or Paraguay - see Duarte Recalde, 2012), only those countries that went through this 
sequence have eventually implemented this kind of reforms in the last decade.7 
                                                 
7
 On the other hand, it goes without saying that, a legitimacy crisis does not necessarily trigger this 
sequence which leads to raise ballot access requirements. As it is well known, in several Latin American 
countries a deep legitimacy crisis ended up with the collapse of the previously existent party system, 
followed by the dominance of populist leaders who managed to restore governability without major 
changes in ballot access rules. An analysis of these leaderships – as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo 
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As Matthew Shugart notes, it is the coalescence of inherent and contingent factors 
what turns the introduction of an electoral reform possible. Inherent factors refer to the 
flaws in the functioning of the electoral system. Contingent factors are those which 
eventually trigger the reform, namely the interests and calculations which unleash the 
political decision of those who yield enough power to make legislatures pass a reform.  
Contingent factors may materialize because political actors believe they will be 
better off under new rules (outcome-contingent factors). But contingent factors can also 
exist when political actors evaluate that the very act of voting for a reform in the 
direction suggested by the inherent factors will improve their public image, or when 
they consider that not voting for such a reform could harm their approval rates (act-
contingent factors) (Shugart, 2001:26-7). This means that, firstly, relevant political 
actors must identify the existence of a problem in the functioning of the electoral 
system, and then, at certain point, those actors with the power to pass a reform must find 
it convenient to implement it.  
The following paragraphs describe in some detail the process by which ballot 
access was eventually raised in our four cases.  
 
Colombia: The 1991 Constitution and micro-electoral enterprises 
By the 1980s Colombian political system, which had been historically dominated 
by the Liberal and Conservative parties, became increasingly defined as an exclusive 
two-party system (Gutiérrez Sañín, 2001). Even the growing levels of political violence 
were then usually attributed to the rigid control of the political system exercised by 
traditional parties. This rigid control ushered in a “restricted democracy” (Bejarano and 
Pizarro, 2005), largely based on the clientelistic use of state structures (Archer, 1995). 
Hence in the course of the 1980s a strong consensus emerged on the need to get some 
fresh air into the political system. Already Conservative President Belisario Bentancourt 
(1982-86) endorsed reforms in this line, mostly based on decentralization, including 
mayors´ direct elections. His successor, Liberal President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) 
put forward a constitutional reform which only materialized due to the decision of the 
following president, the also Liberal César Gaviria. As Martin Tanaka puts it “it is clear 
                                                                                                                                               
Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador – is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but in 
any case it is worth saying that these leaders succeeded in restoring the political order introducing 
constitutional reforms which strengthened the position of the president (starting by the presidential re-
election) and many times inclining the electoral field on their benefit.  
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that for both Barco and Gaviria the promotion of an institutional reform was a response 
to the critical situation of violence and to the state legitimacy crisis” (2005:62). 
It is thus not surprising that the enactment of a new Colombian Constitution in 
1991, replacing the one in force since 1886, explicitly held as a primary aim opening up 
the political system. If anything was expected from the Constitutional Assembly this 
was an answer to the social demand of putting an end to a system blamed for granting 
privileges to traditional parties and precluding the emergence of new political forces 
(De la Calle, 2010:392; Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005:245). Yet, the depth of the changes 
introduced by the 1991 Constitution responded to the strong presence of new 
organizations in the composition of the Assembly. Hence even when the constitutional 
reform was sponsored by leaders of a traditional party in order to respond to the 
growing demands (an Act-contingent factor in Shugart´s terminology), the contents of 
the reform were largely defined by anti-establishment forces motorized by an outcome-
contingent factor.8  
The Constitution virtually abolished entry barriers to democratic competition 
(Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005:245). It recognized “social movements” and “groups of 
citizens” as equivalents to parties, requiring 50,000 signatures or 50,000 votes in the 
previous election to obtain legal recognition, which granted access to public funding 
and free media. The Statute on Parties and Movements passed in 1994 went further, 
determining than anyone could register a candidacy without legal recognition, by 
paying a sum to be refunded insofar as the candidate gets 50,000 votes. And still, it was 
the authorization of the so called multiple lists - multiple lists from the same party were 
allowed to compete without pooling their votes - what eventually had the utmost effect 
on party system fragmentation. Lastly, the constitutional reform radically changed the 
Senate electoral system. In order to weaken local party barons, nationalize the 
functioning of party organizations, and encourage the election of minor parties´ 
representatives, the Constitution replaced the election of senators on the basis of 
multiple departmental districts by a single national district (Crisp and Ingall, 2002).  
The broad literature on the consequences of these reforms coincides in stressing 
that while they effectively opened up the Colombian party system, they did so in such a 
way that contributed to its atomization, producing also an enormous disorganization 
                                                 
8
 Although the Liberal Party was the most voted list, it hardly reached 25 representatives of a total of 77, 
while the Conservative party had only 5. Instead, a myriad of third forces, committed all of them to open 
up the political system, got 44 seats in the Assembly, being Democratic Alliance M-19 the biggest force 
with 19 representatives (Hernández Becerra, 2006:342). 
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among parties.9 Certainly, by the beginning of the 1990s the traditional Colombian two-
party system had already fall into a profound crisis, with both liberals and conservatives 
suffering from ruthless factional disputes (Archer, 1995). Thus, the new Constitution 
definitely did not initiate the deinstitutionalization of a system which would have not 
remained unaltered irrespective of what electoral system was in force. However, these 
reforms did contribute to sharpen the crisis of traditional parties as well as to atomize 
the party system (De la Calle, 2010:395).  
The point is that party competition was structurally changed in the years that 
followed the reform. In particular, the option for parties to run multiple lists stimulated 
the deinstitutionalization of parties, paving the way to what came to be known as 
“electoral microenterprises”, which means candidates with no real linkages with a party 
whatsoever, even though they formally run in a party list (Pizarro, 2002). In reality, 
each candidate (or micro-entrepreneur) run his own candidacy with total autonomy from 
the party organization (Shugart et al, 2007; Pizarro, 2008).  
The single national district for the Senate also furthered fragmentation. For 
instance, in the 1998 Senate elections, the most voted list got 1.9 percent of the vote 
(which implied the election of two senators) whereas eight lists obtained a seat with less 
than 1 percent of the vote. The multiplication of lists ended up destroying the remnants 
of party organizations. In terms of Eduardo Pizarro, “the lax rules of the game, whose 
original intention was to broaden the political system, eventually became a factor of 
disorganization and an obstacle to the emergence of alternatives” (2002:4).  
As shown in Table 3, the number of lists competing for the Senate and the House of 
Representatives exponentially increased from 1991 to 2002, the last election before the 
2003 reform. 
Table 3: Colombia. Number of lists in legislative elections, 1991-2002  
Election Lists for Senate Lists for House of Representatives 
1991 143 486 
1994 251 628 
1998 319 692 
2002 321 906 
Sources: Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005:246; Roll y Jiménez, 2011:5-6 
                                                 
9
 See Gutiérrez, 2001; Pizarro, 2002; Pizarro and Bejarano, 2005; Shugart et al, 2007.    
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The growth in the number of competing lists was paralleled by a rise in the number 
of effective parties in both chambers of Congress, which increased from 2.2 in 1990 to 
7.39 in 2002 in the House and to 9.19 in the Senate (Taylor, 2009:93).  
Already by the late 1990s a solid consensus had cemented amongst experts and 
politicians on the deleterious consequences of the regulations introduced in 1991 and 
1994. By then, Colombian political crisis was no longer attributed to a restricted 
institutional design but precisely to the opposite, an extreme level of laxity (Bejarano 
and Pizarro, 2005:245-6; Gutiérrez, 2001). When President Ernesto Samper created the 
´Comission for the Study of Party Reform´ in 1995 the inherent factors to reform were 
already visible, and from then on they would only get stronger. In fact, during the 1998 
electoral campaign conservative candidate Andrés Pastrana promised an electoral 
reform as a mode to gain support from voters and other political forces. But the 
contingent factors would only mature during the presidency of Alvaro Uribe.  
The 2002 presidential elections exposed some of the main symptoms of the 
dissolution of the historical Colombian two-party system, but simultaneously the 
elections results engendered the conditions to reform the rules that had led to the 
atomization of the political system. These elections were symptomatic because both 
parties which had dominated Colombian politics for a hundred and fifty years were 
relegated by Uribe, who obtained a landslide victory with 53 percent of the vote, 
running as an independent candidate, and denouncing the spurious “politiquería” of 
traditional parties.10  
But these elections were also the inflection point which would lead to political 
reform. Uribe – as other presidential candidates before him - had committed himself 
during the electoral campaign to initiate his term by launching an electoral reform. But, 
unlike his predecessors, Uribe managed to make use of his high approval rates as well 
as of the decomposition of traditional parties to obtain high rates of legislative success, 
even when Primero Colombia lacked a legislative majority (Milanese, 2008).11 
Additionally, the consensus, which included public opinion on the need to reform 
electoral and party rules, had gained so much strength that promoting some kind of 
reform became an Act-contingent factor for party politicians. Leaders of legislative 
                                                 
10
 Uribe, who had defected from the Liberal Party, was this time supported by a myriad of groups - 
including the, by then electorally irrelevant, Conservative Party - under the label “Primero Colombia” 
(Colombia First). 
11
 During Uribe`s first term 67% of senators and 40% of deputies switched parties, most frequently to join 
Uribistas’ groups (Roll y Jiménez, 2011:12) 
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groups did not find it convenient to be observed as confronting with a popular president, 
and rejecting the electoral reform (Shugart et al, 2007). On the other hand, turning back 
to single party lists became a reasonable measure for traditional parties` politicians, who 
in the wake of the 2002 elections saw the disappearance of their parties as a real 
possibility, reinforced by multiple lists (Shugart et al, 2007). Hence, in July 2003 Uribe 
obtained the agreement of conservatives, liberals, and part of the leftist Democratic Pole 
to advance a reform with contents that already had the broad consensus of experts on 
electoral and party law (Roll y Jiménez, 2011:4).  
The reform was explicitly aimed to set more restrictive conditions for ballot access. 
According to David Roll and Nadia Pérez (2011:4), it was about bringing some order 
into the chaos that by then characterized Colombian electoral competition.  
The new rules had immediate effects on the number of competing lists. However, 
they were less successful in lowering the effective number of parties and limiting the 
extreme personalization of the political process (Albarracín and Milanese, 2012; Clavijo 
et al, 2009; Pachón y Hoskin, 2011). Since then, experts in this field and politicians 
alike coincided in that achieving the reform’s goals would demand stricter requirements 
for party recognition.12 Hence it was no wonder that in 2009, in occasion of a new 
constitutional reform, called responding to a different issue,13 the threshold was raised 
from 2 to 3 percent, both to be elected as well as to retain legal recognition. The 
certitude that the two percent threshold had not been enough to prevent the atomization 
of the system worked as the inherent condition.  
Naturally, for the main political forces closing up the political system was a 
convenient decision. A political landscape, in which the demand to open up the political 
system had receded in the face of a hugely popular president, turned this convenience 
into a possible public policy.   
In sum, in 1991 a political crisis which included a profound crisis of parties` 
legitimacy paved the way to a reform whose main goal was to open up the political 
system. This gave place to an extremely lax scheme of ballot access (De la Calle, 
2010:417). The implementation of this reform sped up the process of factionalism, 
personalization and fragmentation of party politics. As a consequence, a new consensus 
                                                 
12
 For example, scholar Augusto Hernández Becerra held in 2006 that “if the goal really consists in 
fostering the emergence of a moderate multi-party system, it would have been indispensable a threshold 
no lower than 5 per cent” (2006:358). 
13
 The Legislative Act 1 of 2009 was above all the answer of Colombian politicians to the scandal caused 
by the linkage between a group of legislators and paramilitary groups  (the “parapolítics  scandal”) 
(Rodríguez Pico, 2011) 
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emerged on the need to do away with the extreme laxness of the electoral system 
through reforms which sought to strengthen parties´ cohesiveness and the governability 
of the political system. A highly popular president who had pledged himself to change 
electoral and party rules decided to put pressure on Congress, which ended up passing 
the reform. The evidence that, in spite of having reached certain goals, the reforms had 
not led to a moderate multi-party system implied the inherent factor to elevate the 
threshold. This measure was taken when, in the context of a political crisis, a 
Constitutional Assembly could amend electoral rules.  
 
Peru: Fujimorismo and party system collapse 
In Peru, the last years of the 1980s witnessed the discredit of those parties which 
had dominated the political scene during the democratic transition. The standing of 
Acción Popular and the Partido Popular Cristiano had been severely hurt by the poor 
performance of President Fernando Belaúnde (1980-85), whom both parties had 
supported. Similarly, the historically popular APRA fell into bankruptcy following Alan 
Garcia`s disappointing presidency (1985-90). Lastly, Izquierda Unida crumbled by 
ruthless factional struggles.  
The 1990 presidential campaign turned apparent the breakdown of the party system. 
The main contenders, Mario Vargas Llosa and Alberto Fujimori, both outsiders to the 
party system, embodied personalized candidacies sponsored by brand-new labels 
(Cotler, 1995:346-7). By then, the Peruvian party system revealed clear symptoms of 
collapse (Dietz and Myers, 2007; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). Fujimori reached 
power running by an ad-hoc party, Cambio 90 (Change 90), holding a political 
discourse hostile to traditional party politics. In the wake of the 1992 self-coup, 
Fujimori called a Constitutional Assembly supposedly destined to put an end to what he 
called “false democracy” which had so far dominated Peru. The new Constitution – 
passed by a majority of Fujimorist14 - replaced the bicameral Congress, with 
departmental districts of low and medium magnitude, by a unicameral legislature 
formed by 120 members elected in a single district without threshold. This was 
expected to benefit Fujimori, since the simultaneity between presidential and legislative 
elections would produce strong coattail effect, freeing the president from the need to 
negotiate with local bosses and to develop a territorial organization (which he lacked). 
                                                 
14
 In the elections for the Constitutional Assembly , held in November 1992, the ruling coalition obtained 
44 out of 80 representatives.  
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But, at the same time, the huge district magnitude without threshold turned it possible to 
reach seats with less than 0.8% votes. As expected, this stimulated the fragmentation 
and personalization which already existed in the field of the opposition (Tuesta, 
2008:840). The low amount of votes required to obtain a seat worked as a new factor for 
atomization. With no chances to win the presidency, opposition groups had no incentive 
to form electoral coalitions (Tanaka, 2005:108). For opposition politicians, heading a 
personal list became the most reasonable option to reach a seat in Congress. In this way, 
rather than the openness of the political system, the reform triggered its fragmentation 
(Tanaka, 2005:96).  
As in the case of Colombia and the 1991 Constitution, the institutional reforms 
implemented by Fujimori did not spawn the atomization of the Peruvian party system. 
However, also as in Colombia, these reforms hastened this process, which ended up 
with the disintegration of party structures (Meléndez, 2006). There was a proliferation 
of what Steven Levitsky and David Cameron called disposable parties, which means 
parties created as a politician’s personal device to run an election. “Somos Perú” (We 
are Peru), “Perú Posible” (Possible Peru), “Perú Ahora” (Peru now), “Perú 2000”, 
“Vamos Vecino” (Neighbor go) were but some, among the many labels created to 
promote a specific candidate in one election, with no real expectations to set up an 
enduring organization, nor to link the party to civil society (Levitsky and Cameron, 
2003:10-14). 
The number of lists competing in national legislative elections had already grown 
from 12 to 16 from 1985 to 1990, but for the first national elections disputed under the 
new Constitution they climbed up to 20. Yet, fragmentation turned more visible in the 
number of lists getting seats, rather than in the competing lists,  As shown in table 4, 
while only six lists had obtained legislative representation in 1985 and eight did it in 
1990, the 1995 elections gave place to a Congress with representatives elected out of  
thirteen different lists.  
Table 4: Lists competing and obtaining seats in Peru, 1980-1995 
 Competing Lists Lists that obtained seats 
1980 15 5 
1985 12 6 
1990 16 8 
1995 20 13 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Meléndez, 2006:55 and Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 
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All through Fujimori’s government, the political stage was dominated by the 
president on the one hand, and “the opposition”, a myriad of independent figures with 
no stable party organizations, on the other (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). Still, once 
Fujimori’s government came to an end, political elites decided to advance 
democratization by reducing entry barriers to electoral competition. In that line, the 
amount of signatures required to form a new party was drastically reduced from four per 
cent of the electoral register (certainly a very high requirement which had subsisted all 
over the Fujimorista period) to one per cent. As it was to be expected, this favored the 
proliferation of new parties (Tanaka, 2005:108). But, on the other hand, the post-
Fujimori elites decided to return to a system of 25 multi-member districts (most of them 
of low magnitude) for legislative elections, so downgrading the proportionality of the 
electoral system. 
In any case, in the context of the democratization process that followed the collapse 
of Fujimorismo, it began to gain ground among experts and politicians the notion of the 
need to stop the breaking up of the party system. Following this reasoning, the extreme 
weakness and dispersion of political parties was meant to be addressed by a profound 
political reform (Tanaka, 2002; Lynch, 2004; Meléndez y León, 2010).  
This suggests that the inherent factor for reform was already present when, shortly 
after the 2001 elections, the Congress created the sub-committee for the drafting of a 
party law.15 National and international NGOs, along with scholars and politicians 
debated the bill, which ended up in a law passed with a broad multi-party consensus 
(Meléndez, 2006:46; IDEA, 2004). Martín Tanaka reviews the combination of inherent 
and contingent factors which contributed to the approval of the law. According to 
Tanaka, the bill expressed “a common sense held by the academic community, the 
NGOs and some cooperation agencies” in the sense of setting more stringent 
requirements to recognize parties, and rewarding the fulfillment of these requirements 
with financial support and the monopoly of political representation. But all in all – 
Tanaka follows -, the law was passed as a result of “the main parties´ calculus on the 
need to establish some order that enables the most consolidated parties to remove from 
the electoral arena those spontaneous candidates that in a lucky strike in the midst of an 
electoral campaign could compete in an effective manner with them” (2005:122). 
                                                 
15
 From the renounce of Fujimori in November 2000 to the approval of the party law in 2003, around 40 
bills to regulate party activities were proposed to the Peruvian Congress (IDEA, 2004). 
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When the law was passed, by the end of 2003, it was expected that it would lead to 
a system with a small number of players. (Meléndez, 2007:264). Above all, as 
mentioned in the first section of this paper, the requirement to set up members` 
committees distributed around the country appeared as a barrier hard to overcome. 
Nonetheless, by September 2005 the 24 political organizations, registered when the law 
was approved, had managed to fulfill the requirements, while five new ones had done 
the same (Tuesta, 2006:779).  
Several among the main pundits on Peruvian politics coincided then that the party 
law had been a step in the right direction, but also that it should have been more 
stringent regarding the requirements to create parties (see for instance Tanaka, 2004). In 
this context, in July 2005 President Alejandro Toledo announced a bill to stop party 
system fragmentation. On the basis of that bill, in October 2005 the major party groups 
in Congress - APRA, Unidad Nacional, Perú Posible, and the Frente Independiente 
Moralizador – provided the necessary votes to reform the electoral law, fixing a 
threshold of four percent of the national vote to obtain a seat in 2006, and of five 
percent since 2010. The same bill amended the party law abolishing the option to retain 
parties´ legal recognition by getting one representative, and demanding the election of 
six representatives instead. 
In sum, the reform was receptive to the experts´ claim on the need to fix stricter 
requirements to parties, while at the same time responded to the natural interest of the 
relatively most established political groups to exclude potential challengers.16 Once 
again, the notion that the electoral system and the party law were flawed was followed 
and complemented by the interest of powerful political actors.  
The 2006 elections proved that the reform had been effective in reducing the 
number of parliamentary parties (seven lists got seats, instead of the eleven which had 
done so in 2001), but not in reducing the number of registered parties. By then, there 
were 36 registered parties, which run 24 lists for Congress and 20 for president, the 
highest score in Peruvian history. The persistence of fragmentation led experts to insist 
in strengthening the control over the fulfillment of legal requirements (Meléndez, 
2006:48) and also in increasing party-formation costs (Tuesta, 2008b; Tanaka, 2009). 
As a reaction to these evaluations, in December 2009 Congress passed Law 29490, 
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 Of course, the new barriers were rejected by minor parties Acción Popular and Alianza Nacional 
proposed lower thresholds (between 1 and 3 percent). The reform was challenged before the courts, but 
the Constitutional Tribunal ratified it.   
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which amended party law elevating from one to three percent of the previous elections´ 
turnout the number of members required by parties to obtain legal recognition. 
This description shows that the Peruvian case followed the four steps of the 
sequence. First, there was a severe legitimacy crisis which ended up in a party system 
collapse, which in this case was followed by the emergence of an outsider, President 
Fujimori. Second, once in power Fujimori advanced a Constitutional reform including a 
new composition of Congress and a new electoral system to elect its members. Third, 
the reforms favored the dominance of the ruling party and, more important to our 
concerns, encouraged the fragmentation of opposition forces into disposable parties. 
Finally, the fall of Fujimorismo was followed by an increasing concern on the extreme 
weakness of Peruvian parties and, therefore, by a consensus on the need to regulate the 
electoral and party fields in order to limit fragmentation and strengthen party 
organizations. The demands to open the system, dominating since the late 1980s, were 
replaced in the post-Fujimori period by an emphasis on the need for solid and structured 
parties. This consensus functioned as a powerful inherent factor. In the meantime, 
consistent economic growth – mostly owed to the rise in commodity prices - improved 
the standing of the ruling political elites. The interest of the relatively most established 
parliamentary groups to raise ballot access requirements offered the outcome-contingent 
factor which led to the passing of the new party law. In the subsequent years it was 
apparent that the goal to strengthen parties and consolidate a stable party system had not 
been and would not be achieved with the party law as it had been originally approved. 
In this context, the experts´ suggestions on the need to set more stringent requirements 
coalesced with major parties´ interests, leading to successive amendments, all of them 
raising party-formation costs.  
 
Mexico. Between regime openness and the capture of public funding 
The 1988 elections implied a turning point in Mexican politics. The emergence of 
the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) produced the first really competitive 
presidential election in Mexican history. Even when the ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) might have actually been the most voted party, few doubted 
then that a massive fraud had been perpetrated (Magaloni, 2005:122). The elected 
president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and the same hegemonic party regime, were 
involved in a huge legitimacy crisis (Craig and Cornelius, 1995). As one of the many 
consequences of this crisis, President Salinas took the initiative to implement a political 
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reform, hoping to recover part of the lost legitimacy (Flores Andrade, 2005:140). 
Among the many and significant changes introduced by the 1989-90 reforms there were 
two complementary points which would encourage the creation of new parties. On the 
one side, the re-introduction of the so called conditional register, a mechanism that 
enabled new parties to run elections without meeting the requirements to obtain the 
permanent legal recognition, and still receive half of the public funding that registered 
parties received.17 On the other, the introduction of different public funding categories, 
which set off a process by which state funding to political parties would be 
progressively and substantially increased. This new legal framework stimulated the 
surge of new political organizations, many of which were suspected of being oriented 
towards the capture of public funding (Poire, 2005; Flores Andrade, 2006). Already for 
the 1991 legislative elections, the first following the reform, 12 organizations requested 
a conditional register. And even when the Electoral Federal Institute (IFE) rejected most 
of the requests, 10 parties managed to run in these elections, the highest number in 
Mexican electoral history. The formation of new parties with conditional register, 
presumably to capture public funding, became a common practice in successive 
elections (Flores Andrade, 2007). This evidence led to the elimination of the conditional 
register in 1996, but at the same time the requirements to obtain a permanent register 
were changed to make them moderately more flexible. This reform reduced the number 
of citizens´ assemblies (from 16 state assemblies or 150 districts assemblies to 10 and 
100 respectively) and modified the requirements regarding party members, from a total 
of 65,000 to a minimum of 3,000 in 10 states or 300 in 100 districts, which had to make 
up at least 0.13 percent of the national electoral register. Simultaneously, the reform 
consolidated the dominant role of public funding in electoral campaigns, setting an 
annual increase to be defined by the IFE (Andrade Sánchez, 1997). These measures 
accelerated the previously described dynamics: for the 2000 federal elections the record 
of competing parties was surpassed once again, whereas only six out of the eleven 
competing parties were new ones.  
Since 1990 there was a slight growth in the number of parties competing in Mexican 
federal elections, from eight in 1988 to eleven in 2000 and 2003. But the reason that led 
to revise party-formation costs was not this very moderate growth but the abuses that 
resulted from the combination of relatively lax entry barriers, abundant public funding, 
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 The conditional register had been created in 1977 and eliminated in 1986. It is called conditional 
because obtaining the permanent register was conditioned to getting a certain percentage of the vote.  
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and low exit costs.18 Indeed, from 1990 to 2003 there is a pattern of permanent creation 
of new parties that, lacking electoral support, lose the register after their first electoral 
experience. Overall, between 1991 and 2003 18 new parties were created, 11 of which 
did it since 1997 responding to the strong increase of public funding (Flores Andrade, 
2006). Most of these parties never achieved significant electoral support, and only four 
of them obtained seats in Congress. Moreover, only a few among these parties managed 
to maintain the register, usually resorting to coalitions with bigger parties. The majority, 
by contrast, and as shown in table 6, did not reach two percent of the vote in their first 
elections and therefore had their registration cancelled.  
Table 6: Number of new parties and new parties which failed to retain the register, 1982-2003 
1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 
3 – 1 2 – 0 2 – 0 4 – 4 3 - 2 2 – 2 6 – 3 3 - 3 
Source: own elaboration on the basis of data from Flores Andrade, 2006 
 
As a result, a debate on new parties gained ground among scholars and politicians. 
This discussion took into account the fact that these parties were recipients of large 
sums of money, which in many cases seemed to be the major reason for their formation 
(Poire, 2005; Flores Andrade, 2007:473-4; Langston, 2007:245). Thus the inherent 
factor for a reform in this field was already present when a particular event came to 
reinforce it. In May 2003 the IFE applied a millionaire fine to the Nationalist Society 
Party (PSN) (which had competed for the first time in the 2000 elections) for a huge 
fraud in the use of public funds.19  
All Mexican parties, including the three major ones (PRI, PRD and National Action 
Party-PAN) had previously been fined because of the irregular use of public funds. But 
the PSN affaire made it evident how new parties were formed to profit from the 
relatively lax rules (Flores Andrade, 2005). In this context, in December 2003 the two 
biggest parties in Congress – PAN and PRI - supported a bill proposed by the Green 
Party to amend the Electoral Code in order to prevent the formation of parties oriented 
to capture state funding.  
As described in the first section of this paper, the reform substantially raised the 
requirements to obtain the register and run elections, both in terms of the number of 
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 Anselmo Flores Andrade refers to the “low exit costs” meaning the lack of penalties and mechanisms to 
recover the money from parties that do not reach the register (2007:475-6).  
19
 The party had used a high share of the funds to hire two companies linked to a party leader. See “Multa 
de 140 millones 800 mil pesos al Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista”, La Jornada, April 24, 2003. 
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assemblies as in the total amount of party members (which was doubled from 0.13 to 
0.26 per cent of the national electoral register). But, additionally, the law set a ban on 
new parties to run elections forming part of an electoral coalition, forcing them to get 
the 2 percent necessary to obtain the register by themselves. In the words of PAN 
deputy Yolanda Valladares, who spoke for the bill in Congress, the reform crystallized a 
“social demand to close the doors to parties living off the public budget.”20 The bill was 
approved by a landslide majority in both chambers of Congress, and only some of the 
minor parties, along with a few PRD legislators, opposed it.21  
For the Green Party, a minor but established organization which used to reach the 
two percent threshold, the clear goal was to hamper the emergence of potential 
competitors.22 For the major Mexican parties - PAN, PRI, and PRD- as also was the 
case of major parties in Colombia and Peru, closing the political system was, obviously, 
in their benefit, even more so when – contrary to what happened a decade and a half 
earlier – this measure run parallel to public opinion demands.   
In any case, it is apparent that the existence of inherent factors – a public opinion 
refusing to allocate funds to non-representative parties – was followed by contingent 
factors: the winners of the 2003 elections, along with a minor one, highly motivated to 
halt the emergence of competitors, found the appropriate situation to hurdle the access 
and mostly the permanence of new parties.  
The crisis of the hegemonic party regime after the scandalous 1988 elections 
triggered a wave of reforms. Certainly, the most publicized of these reforms tended to 
guarantee a fairer electoral field, but others pointed to ease the entrance of new actors to 
the political system. In this line, the reforms set relatively lax requirements to ballot 
access, first through the conditional register, and then making it easier to obtain the 
permanent register. But, above all, it was the introduction of an enormous amount of 
public funding for all registered parties what encouraged the formation of new parties.  
These reforms were effectively followed by a surge of new political parties, but 
most of them never reached the required electoral support to retain the register. Some 
cases of fraud, and in particular the PSN affair, gave rise to questioning the lenient 
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 See “Diputados endurecen requisitos para formar nuevos partidos político”, La Jornada, December 28, 
2003 
21
 The law was passed with 426 affirmative votes and only 21 votes against in the Chamber of Deputies, 
and with 100 votes for and 16 against in the Chamber of Senators. The Labor Party contested the 
constitutionality of the law, but the Supreme Court ratified it.  
22
 More specifically, the bill was motivated by the announcement of multimillionaire businessman known 
as Dr. Simi – a declared enemy of his brother and leader of the Green Party, Jorge González Torres – to 
form a new party which would directly compete with the Green Party.   
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requirements set forth by the Mexican law to get the register. A solid parliamentary 
majority formed by the two biggest parties (the ruling PAN and the PRI), joined by part 
of the PRD, and the small Green Party, amended the Electoral Code raising the 
requirements for parties to achieve and retain legal recognition.  
 
Argentina: From ¡que se vayan todos! to party system fragmentation 
In December 2001 Argentina suffered a dramatic social revolt which put into 
question the legitimacy of its political system and, above all, that of the major parties´ 
political elites. Two parties dominated Argentine politics over the course of the 20 
century, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Peronist or Justicialista Party (PJ). But 
already in the 1990s the strong political identities developed around these two parties 
showed clear signs of erosion. Popular trust in parties suffered from a continuous 
decline, falling from 84 per cent in 1984 (in the wake of the transition to democracy) to 
a meager 15 per cent in 1999, only to plummet to a 4 per cent in 2001, the lowest rate in 
Latin America at that moment (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008:22). Simultaneously, there 
was a substantial growth in electoral volatility rates whereas the appearance of many 
new and generally ephemeral parties became a common treat of the Argentine political 
system (Mustapic, 2002; Torre, 2003). The rupture in party-society linkages became 
manifest in all its intensity in the last quarter of 2001. In the October legislative 
elections almost fifty percent of the citizens opted for what the media called an “anger 
vote”, casting blank and null votes or failing to vote at all. In the context of a severe 
economic crisis, social and political tension did not stop rising, to explode in December 
19 and 20 into a massive civil rebellion against the entire political class under the 
explicit slogan ´¡Que se vayan todos!´ (throw everyone out!). Middle-classes 
cacerolazos (pot-banging demonstrations) and unemployed movements piquetes, along 
with strikes and protests of all kinds made up the scene for a profound political crisis, 
leading to the resignation of President Fernando De la Rúa. The new president 
designated by Congress also resigned a few days later, to be replaced by Peronist leader, 
Eduardo Duhalde. As Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo put it, for some 
months Argentina “teetered on the brink of anarchy” (2003:151), while politicians, 
identified as responsible for the crisis, were harassed on streets and suffered 
demonstrations in front of their offices and homes.  
However, it would soon be apparent that the Argentine party system would not 
suffer a total collapse. Unlike what happened in Peru (or for that matter in Venezuela), 
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Argentine political crisis did not end up in the arrival of political outsiders. Rather, it 
was the well-established PJ that supplied the leaders and the political structure which 
would be in charge of providing with a resolution to the crisis (Levitsky, 2003; Torre, 
2003). The new Peronist government, however, saw itself in the need to respond to the 
massive claim for a political reform. Actually, political reform had become an issue in 
the years preceding the 2001 outburst and, as a matter of fact, President De la Rúa´s 
administration had publicized the political decision to modify the electoral system and 
regulate party’s financing . Yet, the 2001-2002 crisis gave the notion of political reform 
a new significance. As noted by Inés Pousadela, any program that attempted to offer a 
solution to the political crisis had to include, necessarily, a proposal of electoral and 
party law reform (2007:2).  
While in the main squares of the country people still demonstrated inspired in the 
“Que se vayan todos!”, President Duhalde announced a “Federal Deal for Political 
Reform”, which purported to meet the demands and proposals put forward by dozens of 
civil society organizations. Although these demands and proposals covered the most 
diverse aspects of the electoral system, overall they all sought to open up the political 
system, eliminating party privileges, which often included the end of partisan monopoly 
on candidacies and a reduction in ballot access requirements. Eventually, Congress23, 
“responding to the pots´ noise” (Dalla Vía, 2010:35), passed a reform package, which 
comprised a party financing law that set a permanent public funding reserve for parties, 
and open primaries to select candidates. Additionally, the open primaries´ law included 
an amendment to the party law which eliminated parties´ register cancellation in case 
they did not reach two percent of the vote in any district within two successive 
elections, which virtually implied the elimination of post-election quantitative 
requirements. This amendment, which received almost no public attention and for 
which there was no legislative debate at that time, would contribute to accelerate the 
fragmentation of Argentine party system. 
It is worth noting that Argentine party law, unlike that of other federal countries as 
Mexico or Brazil, allows parties to run candidates for the federal congress having legal 
recognition in a single electoral district. According to the party law in force since the 
wake of the transition to democracy, to be legally recognized parties were required to 
gather signatures representing 0.4 percent of the district electoral register or just 4,000 
                                                 
23
  The PJ was then the biggest group and UCR a far away second.  
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signatures if the district was bigger than 1 million voters. Legal recognition at the 
national level (necessary to run a presidential candidacy) required the previous 
formation of five district parties. Parties would have their legal recognition cancelled if 
they did not reach two percent of the vote in two successive elections in any district of 
the country. This clause, which had become effective in 1989 (in the aftermath of the 
second election following the approval of the law), gave place to the cancellation of 
more than 179 parties between 1990 and 2000, and thus was the main cause of party 
cancellations in this period (Dalla Vía, 2010:33). Certainly, this had not prevented that 
in the 1990s the deinstitutionalization of major parties and the diminishing value of 
party labels led to the multiplication of legally recognized parties and of competing lists 
(Leiras, 2007). But this latest reform, passed in parallel to the law that granted public 
funding for parties, sped up the rise in the number of parties (Mustapic, 2008).24 As 
illustrated by table 7, the number of parties remained relatively stable during the 1990s, 
growing in the electoral (uneven) years and shrinking in the even years, mostly due to 
the two percent cancellation clause. Since 2002, however, the formation of new parties 
increased dramatically, and the cancellation of parties did not compensate for that 
growth anymore.   
Table 7:  Number of district and nacional parties (1990-2007) 
Year District Parties National Parties Total (District and National) 
1990 504 35 539 
1991 522 35 557 
1992 462 35 497 
1993 473 35 508 
1994 446 34 480 
1995 480 37 517 
1996 447 37 484 
1997 480 37 517 
1998 473 38 511 
1999 513 41 554 
2000 496 41 537 
2001 542 41 583 
2002 548 42 590 
2003 669 46 715 
2004 621 45 666 
2005 668 43 711 
                                                 
24
 The Electoral Court of Appeals held that “the elimination of the cancellation clause decided by law 
25611 to all those parties that do not reach in any district two percent of the electoral register in two 
successive elections, arguing to foster political pluralism actually led to the fragmentation of the system, 
maintaining the recognition of parties with no electoral support, which in some cases are but structures 
deprived of any content and unable to fulfill the functions expected from them.” Partido Social 
Demócrata – Distrito Capital, May 27, 2008. 
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2006 644 43 686 
2007 674 42 716 
 
Source: Mustapic 2012 
 
Thus, while the number of parties – counting both district and national ones- rose 
by a 9.46 per cent in the twelve years going from 1990 to 2002 (from 539 to 590), there 
was a 21.35 per cent of growth between 2002 and 2007 (from 590 to 716). At the same 
time, as it was to be expected - and as shown in table 8 - the increase in the number of 
parties was followed, in some of the most populated districts, by a proliferation of 
competing lists.  
 
 
 
Table 8: Competing lists in legislative elections in four major Argentine provinces 
Year Province of 
Buenos Aires 
City of Buenos 
Aires 
Córdoba Mendoza 
1997 10 15 8 8 
1999 13 16 13 7 
2001 18 19 22 10 
2003 26 33 21 16 
2005 26 29 14 16 
2007 25 30 23 26 
 
In the meantime, the government led by President Néstor Kirchner since May 2003 
had initiated a new political cycle leaving behind the governability crisis and restoring 
presidential legitimacy (Cherny et al, 2010). In a context marked by consistent 
extraordinarily high rates of economic growth, demands to open up the political system, 
which had dominated the political scenario in 2001 and 2002, lost intensity and were 
eventually confined to the margins of the public scene (Pousadela, 2007). Instead, 
politicians and experts began to point out the emerging problem of party system 
fragmentation. Under the new political circumstances the ease to recognize new parties 
was identified as a problem. Rather than promoting new political options coming out 
from civil society, this lax legal framework favored party defection (making it easy for 
politicians to create new labels), and the formation of tiny parties, most times what in 
the jargon were known as rubber stamps, oriented towards the capture of public 
funding. Hence the flexibility of the electoral and party laws was blamed for 
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contributing to downgrading the value of party labels and conspiring against party 
cohesiveness (Leiras, 2007:104-7). Furthermore, the legal framework was found 
responsible for an “inflated electoral offer” which “introduced confusion and opacity in 
the electoral process” (Mustapic, 2008:13). 
Although the two percent of the vote required in order to keep recognition was 
reestablished by the end of 200625, the inherent factor for electoral reform was already 
settled. The rise in the number of parties and lists as a result of a lenient legal 
framework became a common topic of media criticism. By the second half of the year 
2000 the presence of a problem attributable to electoral rules and susceptible to be 
solved through a legal reform had become apparent.26 
These same arguments were adopted by the national government to put forward a 
broad reform in the second half of 2009. Contingent conditions for reform matured after 
the June 2009 legislative elections, when the ruling FPV-PJ was defeated in several 
provinces, in particular in the key Province of Buenos Aires, where a coalition led by a 
defector Peronist beat the list headed by Néstor Kirchner himself.27  
Hence one of the reform’s goals was to make it more difficult for defectors to 
compete through new parties or to make use of parties which subsist as rubber stamps. 
As noted above, the bill imposed more rigorous party-formation costs, as well as a 
threshold of votes to be obtained in the primaries in order to run in general elections. 
Governmental speakers then declared that the main objective was to provide the party 
system stability and order. The bill was sponsored and voted in first place by the ruling 
party (FPV-PJ), but it gained the support of a number of minor allies, which were 
particularly attracted by the free access to media included in the law. In order to get the 
support of these minor allies, the FPV-PJ also accepted to reduce some of the 
requirements which were part of the original bill.28 As for the UCR, which was the main 
opposition group in Congress, it shared the evaluation regarding the need to reduce the 
number of parties fixing stricter requirements for party formation, and agreed on 
reforms towards a more restrictive legal framework. However, this party did not vote 
                                                 
25
 When the open primaries law was repealed, the clause included in this law which eliminated the 2 per 
cent requirement was abrogated.  
26
 A working paper published by the influential think-tank CIPPEC pointed that “… a permissive 
regulation regarding party formation … and public funding, constitute spurious incentives for party 
fragmentation and for the formation of party structures whose goals are far from the representative 
principle” (Straface y Mustapic, 2009). 
27
 The government announced the bill hardly a week after the electoral defeat.  
28
 The original bill was substantially more restrictive than the one finally approved. For instance, the 
threshold in primaries was 3 per cent of the vote instead of the 1.5 eventually passed.   
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for the reform due to disagreements in some minor points and, above all, not to be seen 
by public opinion as a government supporter.29 
 
Conclusion:  
An analysis of the relationship between political legitimacy crisis and electoral 
reform in contemporary Latina America suggests a distinction between three groups of 
countries. First, there is a set of countries which have not suffered from a significant 
political crisis and which, consequently, have not developed inherent conditions for a 
reform, irrespective of the number of parties, the level of fragmentation or the features 
of the existing regulatory framework. Countries as Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, and to 
some extent also Brazil, constitute this group.   
Another group is formed by countries that did go through a profound political 
legitimacy crisis, which was followed by the emergence of populist leaders who 
managed to restore political order. These leaders held an anti-party rhetoric, and 
normally favored non-partisan candidacies. Yet, the quantitative requirements for these 
non-partisan alternatives replicated or were even more stringent than the ones to be met 
by parties. In addition, these leaders fortified the presidency through constitutional and 
legal reforms which helped them to dominate the political system. Additionally, they 
generally tilted the electoral field in their favor by making a massive partisan use of 
state resources (Novaro, 2012). Occasionally, they also imposed specific obstacles for 
ballot access to opposition candidates.30 Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua 
form this group.   
Lastly, there is the group of the four countries which in the course of the last ten 
years approved and implemented party and electoral law reforms raising party 
formation and ballot access requirements. This trend constitutes a novelty in this region, 
which since the third wave and in particular during the 1990s had been dominated by 
reforms in the opposite sense. In this paper I offered a tentative explanation to this 
                                                 
29
 President of the UCR Gerardo Morales stressed: “We believe that it is necessary to reorganize the 
political system; it does not make any sense to have 700 parties in the country. There´re people who have 
a party which they create in some strange way… there should be three, four parties… We should seek 
rules which create some level of responsibility on parties as organizations.” Revista Parlamentario, 
November 7, 2009: http://parlamentario.com/articulo-4225.html.   
30
 This is clearly the case of Venezuela, were the General Comptroller was entitled to prevent public 
officials from running elections. Chavez administration made extensive use of this prerogative to 
proscribe dozens of opposition candidates who held elected positions (mostly mayors and governors). See 
Molina, 2009.  
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trend, which accounts for the occurrence of these reforms in Colombia, Peru, Mexico 
and Argentina (and not in other countries of the region).  
In the period spanning from 1998 to 2001 each of the four analyzed countries went 
through a pronounced political legitimacy crisis. These crises affected the legitimacy of 
traditional political elites and encouraged social demands for institutional reform. In all 
the four cases the reforms initiated or encouraged by social pressures aimed to 
strengthen the linkage between political representatives and society, on the basis of a 
shared belief which identified the crisis of representation with the weakening of that 
linkage. Accordingly, all these countries passed reforms which reduced entry barriers, 
lowering party-formation costs and making easier the election of representatives of 
minor parties. However, once the legitimacy crisis was surmounted – mostly due to a 
new cycle of economic growth – in each one of the countries the negative consequences 
of the previous reforms became apparent. These consequences mainly referred to the 
fragmentation of the party system, and/or abuses regarding the allocation of public 
funding to legally recognized parties. In none of the four countries the reforms 
originated the fragmentation of the party system, but in all of them they did foster it. 
Hence political elites and experts progressively coincided in the existence of a problem, 
which was at least partly attributable to the legal regulation of parties and elections. 
Moreover, in the four cases ruling parties found it convenient to propose a reform 
raising party-formation costs, a proposal which was generally supported by the most 
established political forces, which worked in these cases as a cartel of parties as 
described by Katz and Mair (1995).  
In sum, the latest years have shown a novel trend in party and electoral law reform 
in Latin America signed by the rise of ballot access requirements. The political 
background of these reforms is the waning of traditional party identities and the 
consequent de-freezing of previously existing party systems. Fragmentation appears in 
this framework as the foe to be defeated by electoral and party law reform. But even 
when fragmentation affects a large group of Latin American countries, this trend has so 
far been confined to a small group. Here I have shown that reforms raising ballot access 
have been so far passed only where fragmentation is not only identified as a political 
problem (to the detriment of the legitimacy crisis, which had been overcome), but also 
when it is at least partly perceived as a result of previous reforms which opened up the 
political system. This perception cements the inherent conditions for reform. When 
political circumstances make it possible, major political parties take advantage of these 
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inherent conditions to advance their political interests, which naturally involve closing 
up the party system in a cartelized manner.  
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Appendix I: Party-formation costs in Latin America, 2012 
Country Political 
Representation 
Quantitative requirements to obtain the 
register 
Quantitative requirements to 
retain the register  
Argentina Parties Members, 4%0 of each province electoral 
register to get district recognition. Getting 
5 district recognitions allows for a national 
party 
2% of the vote in two 
consecutive elections in each 
district 
Bolivia Parties, Citizens 
Groups, 
Indigenous 
Peoples 
Parties: members, 2% of the last elections´ 
valid votes on a national basis.  
CG and IP: 2% supporters 
2% of the vote in any federal 
election (president, deputies, 
senators) 
Brazil Parties Members, 0.5% of last election turnout in 
at least one third of the states 
 
Chile Parties Members, 0.5% of the last election turnout 
 
5% of the vote for deputies in at 
least 8 regions or in 3 contiguous 
regions. Alternatively, the 
election of 4 congressmen 
Colombia Parties, Political 
Movements 
50,000 signatures 3% of the national vote 
Costa Rica Parties 3,000 signatures   
Ecuador Parties, Political 
Movements 
Members, 1.5% of the electoral register.  
 
5% of the vote in one of the two 
last national elections 
El Salvador Parties Members, 3% of the last election turnout 2% of national vote in case of a 
party. 6% in case of a two-party 
coalition. 9% in case of a three-
party coalition, and then a 1% 
extra per each party 
Guatemala Parties Members, 0.3% of the electoral register 5% of the vote. Alternatively, the 
election of a representative 
Honduras Parties Signatures, 2% of the last election turnout 2% of the national vote 
Mexico Parties Members, 3,000 in 20 states or 300 in 200 
SMD. The total number must reach 0.26% 
of the national register 
2% of the national vote 
Nicaragua Parties Constitute party committees in all the 153 
municipalities of the country 
 
4% of the national vote. In case 
of electoral coalition, the 
required percentage multiplies 
by the number of parties.  
Panamá Parties Supporters, 4% of the last election turnout 4% of the national vote 
Paraguay Parties 
Movements 
Members, 0.5% of the last election turnout 1% of the national vote 
Perú Parties 
(Movements for 
sub-national 
Members, 3% of the last election turnout 5% of the vote. Alternatively, the 
election of 6 Congressmen 
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elections only) 
Uruguay Parties 0.5% of the electoral register  
Dominican 
Republic 
Parties Members, 2% of last election turnout 2% of the national vote. 
Alternatively, the election of a 
representative, national or 
municipal 
Venezuela Parties, 
Groups  of 
Voters, Citizens 
by their own 
initiative 
Parties: Members, 0.5% of each state 
electoral register to get regional 
recognition. Getting 12 regional 
recognitions allows for a national party. 
Grupos of Voters: 0.5% of members in 
75% of the states to run elections. 
Citizens by their own initiative: 
Signatures, 5% of the national electoral 
register  
 
 
